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I’d like to begin with a paradox. There is a substantial corpus of work that makes use of the com-
parative method and might be equally well described as social history or historical sociology. How-
ever, the view of comparison itself that is held by historians and sociologists, at least the ones of my 
generation or earlier, is rather different, not to say diametrically opposed; sociologists take the val-
ue of comparison for granted, while many historians remain suspicious of it. When they do practice 
comparison, sociologists are bolder, happily moving across great distances in space and time, like 
Michael Mann, for example. Historians are much more cautious hence this paper, without my in-
tending it, has turned into a comparative study itself. 
I 
Comparative history, in the sense of parallel histories, goes back to the ancient world, to Plutarch 
and his parallel lives of Greeks and Romans. The approach was revived in the early modern period, 
especially in Italy, and used to study the virtually simultaneous revolts of the 1640s, extending 
from Catalonia and Portugal, via Naples and Sicily, to the Ukraine and Istanbul. For example, in 
1652 count Maiolino Bisaccioni published an account of these revolts and an attempt to explain 
them in a book entitled Guerre civili de gli ultimi tempi. 
In the eighteenth century, when the idea of system was becoming important, Montesquieu, wheth-
er or not we follow Raymond Aron in calling him a sociologist, compared and contrasted monar-
chies and republics as political and social systems, while Adam Smith contrasted what he called the 
‘mercantile system’ with the system of free trade.  
In the early 19th century, some historians produced parallel histories of states. Ranke wrote on the 
Ottoman and Spanish Empires (1827), for instance, and Joachim Lelewel, the Polish historian in 
exile in France, on Spain and Poland in his Historyczna paralela (1831). 
If one take the comparative method in a more precise sense, however, it was a new discovery be-
ginning in the natural sciences (comparative anatomy, for instance) and spreading to linguistics, 
sociology and literature as well as to history. In Britain, John Stuart Mill produced a classic discus-
sion of the comparative method. In France, it was advocated by Durkheim, and in Germany by We-
ber, who considered himself a historian but has been described by posterity as a sociologist (fa-
vourably by sociologists but pejoratively by some historians). 
In the early twentieth century a comparative approach was advocated by historians of the calibre of 
the Belgian Henri Pirenne and Marc Bloch. In the USA, Crane Brinton and Roger Merriman pub-
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lished comparative studies of revolution, following in the footsteps of Bisaccioni (whether they 
were aware of this or not).  
The comparative approach may be said to have been institutionalized when a journal devoted to 
the subject was founded over half a century ago, in 1958: Comparative Studies in Society and His-
tory. It would be interesting to carry out an analysis of the articles, to discover how many are writ-
ten by sociologists and how many by historians, and also how many are genuinely comparative ra-
ther than mini-monographs that the editor juxtaposes to others on similar themes. 
Since that time, the comparative method has been used regularly by historical sociologists, notably 
by three North Americans, Barrington Moore (1966), Theda Skocpol (1979) and Jack Goldstone 
(1991). Intriguingly, and in a repetition of the first use I cite here, all of them are concerned with 
revolution. Robert Bellah also uses this method, continuing Weber’s work with a study of Bud-
dhism and capitalism in Japan, while other scholars have made comparative studies of bureaucracy 
and the process of industrialization. 
On the other hand, [pure?] historians have been relatively slow to follow the examples of Bloch and 
Pirenne. In the 1970s, when I edited a series of studies in comparative history, it came to an end 
rather quickly after only four titles had been published, because I could not persuade more histori-
ans to collaborate. Many historians imagined comparison as a simple and doomed search for simi-
larities and dismissed comparison, as some still do, with the phrase ‘you can’t compare apples and 
oranges’, an idea that irritated the Belgian classicist Marcel Détienne into writing his brilliant es-
say, Comparer l’incomparable (2000). 
However, the tide may be turning. Recent British examples include three distinguished contribu-
tions. Another classicist, Geoffrey Lloyd, has written about the study of the natural world in ancient 
Greece and ancient China. The global historian Felipe Fernández-Armesto both compares and con-
trasts the histories of North and South America. Sir John Elliott, a scholar with a high reputation 
among both conservative and innovative historians, has long defended comparison and recently 
published a book about the British and Spanish Empires.  
II 
In a sense all historical writing is comparative, at least implicitly. Historians like to say that they 
are concerned with the particular, leaving generalization to social scientists, but as Max Weber 
once remarked, it is only possible to establish ‘what is specific, say, to the medieval city … if we first 
find what is missing in other cities (ancient, Chinese, Islamic)’.  
Explicitly comparative history comes in a number of varieties. Comparisons are usually made be-
tween two or more places, regions or social groups during the same period, leaving comparisons 
between different centuries to historians of literature and art, scholars who are less tied to a single 
period than usual for general historians.  
However, to focus on the same period for both halves of a comparison may not always be the best 
strategy. I had to face this problem in my essay on the patricians of Venice and Amsterdam in early 
modern times, since the apogee of the two groups occurred at different moments, that of the Vene-
tians in the 15th and 16th centuries and that of the Amsterdammers in the 17th century. I decided to 
study them over the same period, the 17th century, in order to see how the two groups, who were 
both involved in international trade, responded to the changing economic situation. 
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Today, one grand comparison between different cultures in different periods awaits a historian 
ambitious enough to undertake it. I am thinking about comparisons and contrasts between the 
Christian Reformation of the 16th century and the Muslim Reformation of our own time. Where 
the first Reformation was associated with the printing press, the second Reformation depends on 
newer technologies such as the video cassette, allowing the laity to listen to and to discuss sermons 
in their own homes. I hasten to add that this is not my idea: Ernest Gellner used to speak about 
Muslim Puritanism, while Eickelman has considered the place of new media in new forms of Islam, 
but the theme is surely still in need of development. 
Again, there are different forms or levels of comparison. Between whole cultures or aspects of them 
(such as birth-rates, literacy, etc), or between events such as revolutions (including scientific revo-
lutions), and structures, such as feudalism. Or between what Bloch called ‘neighbourly compari-
sons’, such as kingship in England and France, and distant comparisons, such as feudalism in 
France and Japan.  
Some historians prefer precise, systematic, quantitative comparisons (the size of cities, for in-
stance, or the number of calories consumed or the number of hours worked in different places, pe-
riods or social groups). Other scholars practice more intuitive, qualitative comparisons – between 
ideas, for instance, between systems of education or even between individuals (such as the 17th-
century statesmen, Richelieu and Olivares). 
Some scholars look mainly for similarities, others for differences. Paradoxically, though, a focus on 
apparent similarities sometimes generates awareness of underlying differences, while an emphasis 
on difference may lead to the discovery of similarities, especially functional equivalents, a concept 
that has, I think, outlived the demise of functionalism.  
Comparison makes absences more visible and a few comparative studies have been explicitly con-
cerned with such absences. Werner Sombart, officially an economist but active in sociology and 
history as well, published a famous article entitled: Why is there no socialism in the United States? 
To the example of Sombart we might add those of Durkheim’s follower Marcel Granet on the ab-
sence of notions of sin and law in China; Joseph Needham on the absence of a Scientific Revolu-
tion, again in China, leading to a great debate on the ‘Needham question’; or Ross McKibbin’s es-
say, inspired by Sombart, ‘Why was there no Marxism in Great Britain?’  
III 
On this interdisciplinary occasion it may be useful to return to first principles and to ask: Why 
compare at all? What are the uses or advantages of comparison? I can think of two main answers to 
this question. 
In the first place, we need to make comparisons in order to avoid campanilismo at its different lev-
els (city, nation, or the whole of the west). Détienne makes this point eloquently: “Il y a une valeur 
éthique de l’activité comparative … C’est qu’elle invite à mettre en perspective les valeurs et les 
choix de la société à laquelle on appartient …on apprend … à porter un regard critique sur son pro-
per tradition” (Détienne 2000, 59).  
It was for this reason that Arnaldo Momigliano praised Toynbee, despite the many weaknesses of A 
Study of History, as a contribution to deparochialization. As Elliott recently re-iterated: ‘Even im-
perfect comparisons can help to shake historians out of their provincialisms’. 
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It is easy when beginning research, all too easy, to think of one’s chosen topic as special, singular or 
even unique, especially if the topic comes from one’s own culture.  
In Britain, for instance, historians of the early modern period have taken considerable interest in 
the Grand Tour to Italy and elsewhere undertaken by British aristocrats, often without realizing 
that nobles from other countries, especially in northern Europe from the Netherlands to Poland, 
undertook similar tours for similar reasons. Whether there were national or regional differences in 
routes taken or places seen remains to be discovered – a comparative study is yet to be undertaken. 
The question of singularity is – in yet another paradox – a general one. A comparative historian 
will [might?] note that exceptionality has been asserted by a number of different nations such as 
the British, French, Spanish, Germans (with their famous Sonderweg), Russians (with their Rus-
sian soul), Americans, Japanese (with the nihonjinron tradition) and so on.  
Island-nations such as Britain and Japan have been guilty of insularity. In the Spanish case, we 
might speak of peninsularity, but the cases of France, Russia, Germany and the USA remind us that 
the problem is a more general one – cultural nationalism. The Belgian historian Pirenne, after the 
First World War, advocated the comparative method precisely as an antidote to nationalism. As a 
recent study by the French historian Anne-Marie Thiesse points out, the process of the creation of 
national identities, with their stress on the unique qualities of each nation, is a process with many 
common features. 
On a smaller scale than the nation, note the idea of the singularity of Venice, which goes back at 
least as far as Francesco Sansovino’s Venetia città nobilissima e singolare (1581). Rather than ask-
ing whether or not early modern Venice was singular, it would be more useful to ask: In what ways, 
and to what extent, was it singular? Venice differed from Florence in the same period in some ways, 
from Genoa in other ways, from Amsterdam in others, from ancient Rome in others, from Bangkok 
or the Japanese port of Sakai in still more, but yet it still had something in common with each of 
them. Viewed within comparative perspective, Venice appears to be a unique combination of ele-
ments, most of which have parallels elsewhere.  
On a larger scale, think of the idea of the singularity of the West. Today, one of the leading crusad-
ers against such Eurocentrism is Jack Goody, the British social anthropologist who successfully 
reinvented himself as a historical sociologist or cultural historian. Goody has criticized both the 
sociologist Norbert Elias and the historian Keith Thomas for overemphasizing the uniqueness of 
the West.  
More generally, he has denounced what he calls the ‘theft of history’, that is the description by 
western historians of humanism, individualism, capitalism, modernity and so on as if they were 
completely western discoveries or inventions, ignoring parallels in China, the Islamic world and 
elsewhere.  
So the first argument in favour of comparison is a rather general one, that it discourages collective 
narcissism. 
Secondly, and more precisely, it has often been pointed out that a comparative approach, including 
[that encompasses?] contrasts, allows us to test explanations. Whenever we offer historical expla-
nations of anything, we depend on implicit comparison. The question: ‘why did the French Revolu-
tion happen?’ implies, why not in England? Why not 50 years earlier or later? And so on. Making 
the comparisons explicit makes explanations easier to test.  
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Again, the recent interest in what is known as ‘counter-factual’ history – if the Spanish Armada had 
landed in England, for example – depends upon comparison, between what we believe to be the 
consequences of something that happened and the possible consequences of something that didn’t 
happen. 
As Goody puts it: “Comparison is one of the few things we can do in the historical and social sci-
ences to parallel the kind of experiments the scientists do”. (cf. S. F. Nadel (1951) Foundations of 
Social Anthropology and Piasare, L’etnografo imperfetto). 
An obvious topic for collective research of this kind is emigration and immigration. One might 
study the history of emigration from different places (such as Italy, the Ottoman Empire and Japan 
in the later 19th century) to different places (USA, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, etc.), to see how far 
the reception of the emigrants varied with the culture of the hosts or the guests.  
We also need comparison, as I suggested earlier, to draw our attention to significant absences. In 
Brazil, the absence of the press and of universities in colonial times leaps to the eye as soon as we 
look at Brazil’s neighbours, the viceroyalties of Mexico and Peru. The Spanish Empire decentral-
ized, while the Portuguese colonial strategy was to centralize both printing and higher education in 
the metropolis. 
IV 
It is time to turn to the negative side to problems with, and critiques of, comparison. 
A recent critique comes from the supporters of connected history or histoire croisée especially, but 
not exclusively, in France. Their sharpest criticisms concern the creation of artificial entities such 
as Protestantism and capitalism, homogenizing what is, in fact, varied. This is a danger for all his-
torians, comparative or not, since we find it difficult to do without concepts such as ‘Britain’ or the 
‘Renaissance’, but it is especially acute where comparisons are involved. 
The supporters of histoire croisée offer the study of connections, especially intercontinental con-
nections, as a substitute for comparison (‘beyond comparison’, to quote the title of one of the mani-
festos). In my view, connected history is to be welcomed, but not as a replacement for comparative 
history. The two approaches are complementary and we need them both. 
One obvious danger of comparison is that of ignoring the cultural context of the practices or insti-
tutions that one is studying. In the early days of the discipline of anthropology, James Frazer ex-
emplified an ambitious comparative approach in his huge book The Golden Bough, ranging from 
ancient Greece to modern Africa in search of similar practices. In what has become a classic cri-
tique, Bronisław Malinowski pointed out that Frazer ignored cultural contexts and so misunder-
stood both the function of the institutions and the meaning of the practices. As a critique of Frazer, 
he was surely successful, a comparative approach, however, is not tied, or does not have to be tied, 
to a lack of interest in context. 
A second problem or danger is the problem of treating as static groups practices or situations that 
are in reality always changing.,This kind of freezing is not inevitable, however, it is perfectly possi-
ble for a comparative historian to focus on process. In the case of my book on the patricians of Ven-
ice and Amsterdam, for instance, I focussed on a process that has been described as ‘aristocratiza-
tion’. In a culture in which the social group with highest status was that of noble landowners, it was 
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tempting for successful merchants to leave trade and buy land, perhaps even a title, which would 
certainly raise the status of their children, if not their own.  
Another serious danger is linked to one of the greatest successes of the comparative approach, the 
discovery of significant absences. The danger is that of viewing a given culture only [purely?] in 
terms of absences. In a famous study that is now over half a century old, the French historian 
Philippe Ariès noted what he called the absence of a sense of childhood in the Middle Ages. More 
precisely, what he observed or thought he observed was the absence of the idea that children be-
have differently from adults; that in a sense they belong to another culture. Specialists in the Mid-
dle Ages, provoked by Ariès, have produced a more nuanced account of medieval attitudes to chil-
dren, distinguishing those of males and females, for example. 
Distant comparisons in particular raise this problem, as the case of Max Weber illustrates. In his 
day, Weber seemed to escape Eurocentrism by placing his investigation of the rise of capitalism in 
an Asian context. Today, by contrast, he is criticized for Eurocentrism because his comparative 
study assessed other cultures essentially in terms of their lack of what the West possessed (capital-
ism, individualism and even rationality - as he defined it). 
Max Weber was struck by the fact that in Germany in his time, around the year 1900, the North 
was both Protestant and capitalist while the South was neither. He went on to argue that Protes-
tantism encouraged a ‘worldly asceticism’ that allowed merchants to build up their capital in a way 
that Catholicism, Islam or Buddhism did not. 
However, as the American sociologist Robert Bellah has argued, a similar ethos may develop in 
different religions. Writing during the rise of Japanese capitalism in the 1950s, which Weber did 
not live to see, Bellah claims that there was a Japanese Buddhist equivalent to the Protestant ethos. 
The question of absences is one aspect of a larger problem; the problem of ethnocentrism. Michel 
de Certeau’s famous question, ‘Where are you speaking from?’ becomes especially acute; do you 
come from one of the cultures compared, or neither? 
A notorious example of ethnocentric comparison comes from the history of feudalism. Western 
scholars discovered analogies to the feudal society of the West in Japan and India, either exagger-
ating the similarities or treating the differences as deviations from the norm. Within Europe, many 
scholars treated French feudalism as the model into which to fit other forms of medieval society, 
from Scandinavia to Italy.  
The example of feudalism illustrates the way in which western ethnocentrism is encouraged by the 
western origin of the conceptual apparatus with which historians work. Even apparently unspecific 
terms such as ‘university', ‘portrait’, or ‘grammar’ were originally coined with the European experi-
ence in mind, with the consequent danger of forcing Islamic institutions, Indian artefacts or Chi-
nese texts to fit a western model.  
V 
There seems no third way between using this western apparatus of comparison and refusing to 
compare at all. To undertake comparison while remaining aware of the danger of Eurocentrism 
appears to be the lesser evil.  
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One precaution that we can take, though, is to follow what might be called the principle of rotation. 
That is, we can take different regions as the norm in their turn. Weber, Bloch and other famous 
comparatists began with the West. It is equally legitimate to invert the procedure. For example, one 
well-known concept in economic history that has moved from East to West is that of ‘industrious 
revolution’, which Jan de Vries borrowed from Akira Hayami. 
Again, we might discuss whether or not seventeenth-century Spain was a ‘closed’ or ‘secluded’ 
country’ on the model of Japan in the age of sakoku. To a lesser degree, given [their?] expansion in 
the Americas. Or perhaps look at the pleasure quarters of early modern Venice or Rome, Paris or 
London as western examples of the ‘floating world’ (ukiyo) to be found in Japanese cities such as 
Edō, Kyōtō or Ōsaka. Similar catalogues of talents, addresses and prices (Venice, Amsterdam, the 
Covent Garden ladies). Using concepts that originated outside Europe encourages a certain dis-
tanciation from our own culture. 
To summarise, my basic argument is that comparison is risky, but that lack of comparison is even 
more dangerous. It is dangerous because it encourages us to take for granted ideas that need to be 
tested.  
Take the case of Norbert Elias and his famous study of what he called the ‘Civilizing Process’, more 
precisely perhaps the rise in early modern Europe of social pressures towards increasing self-
control (which he believed to be linked to the centralization of government). Elias virtually ignored 
the rest of the world in his study. This was a pity, since the history of some other regions supports 
his theory. 
However, similar pressures and similar results can be found in in Japan (in the age of the taming of 
the samurai in the Tokugawa period) and perhaps China, when it was unified under the Han dynas-
ty.  
The traditional grand narrative of western civilization was an account of uniquely western events: 
renaissance, reformation, scientific revolution, enlightenment and so on. In short, modernity was 
made in Europe and exported elsewhere. It is more realistic, as well as more humble, to think of 
these major events in the plural: renaissances, reformations, enlightenments and modernities. This 
is not to say that all reformations are the same, but that they reveal what Wittgenstein called ‘fami-
ly resemblances’. 
In short, a comparative approach helps historians to test their explanations and also to liberate 
themselves from current assumptions in their own culture, thus taking a few steps towards the pol-
yphonic history that is needed in our increasingly multicultural age. 
 
Peter Burke, Professor emeritus of Cultural History and Fellow of Emmanuel College, 
Cambridge, UK 
